LONDON KEGAN PAUL, TRENCH & CO., 1, PATERNOSTER SQUARE 1883
TO PROFESSOR PASQUALE VILLARI. Yours faithfully,
NINIAN HILL THOMSON. FLORENCE, May 17, 1883. BOOK I. Of the beginnings of Cities in general, and in particular of that of
Rome
II. Of the accidents which led in Rome to the creation of Tribunes of
the People, whereby the Republic was made more perfect
IV. That to give new institutions to a Commonwealth, or to reconstruct
old institutions on an entirely new basis, must be the work of one Man
X. How a free Government existing in a corrupt City may be
preserved, or not existing may be created
XIX. That he who would reform the institutions of a free State, must
retain at least the semblance of old ways
XXVI. Of the creation of the Decemvirate in Rome, and what therein is to
be noted. What a Prince or Republic does of necessity, should seem to be done
by choice
LII. That the People, deceived by a false show of advantage, often
desire what would be their ruin; and that large hopes and brave promises
easily move them
LIV. That the People are strong collectively, but individually weak
LVIII. To what Leagues or Alliances we may most trust, whether those we
make with Commonwealths or those we make with Princes
LX. That contrary to the vulgar opinion, Money is not the sinews of War
XI. That, commonly, Fortresses do much more harm than good
XXV. That he who attacks a City divided against itself, must not think
to get possession of it through its divisions
XXVI. I. For a Sect or Commonwealth to last long, it must often be brought
back to its beginnings
II. That he who would effect changes in a Commonwealth, must give heed
to its character and condition
IX. Whether we may trust more to a valiant Captain with a weak Army,
or to a valiant Army with a weak Captain
XIV. That our Country is to be defended by Honour or by Dishonour, and
in either way is well defended
XLII. I send you a gift, which if it answers ill the obligations I owe you, is
at any rate the greatest which Niccolò Machiavelli has it in his power
to offer. Take this, however, in the spirit in which all that comes from a friend
should be taken, in respect whereof we always look more to the intention
of the giver than to the quality of the gift. BOOK I. And, first, as touching its origin, I say, that all cities have been
founded either by the people of the country in which they stand, or by
strangers. In the second case, namely of a city being founded by strangers, the
settlers are either wholly independent, or they are controlled by
others, as where colonies are sent forth either by a prince or by a
republic, to relieve their countries of an excessive population, or to
defend newly acquired territories which it is sought to secure at small
cost. Of this sort many cities were settled by the Romans, and in all
parts of their dominions. Cities like these, not having had their beginning in freedom,
seldom make such progress as to rank among the chief towns of kingdoms. The capacity of a founder is known in two ways: by his choice of a site,
or by the laws which he frames. But since to be safe they must be
strong, they are compelled avoid these barren districts, and to plant
themselves in more fertile regions; where, the fruitfulness of the soil
enabling them to increase and multiply, they may defend themselves
against any who attack them, and overthrow any who would withstand their
power. These as they have had different origins, so likewise have had different
laws and institutions. For a
Monarchy readily becomes a Tyranny, an Aristocracy an Oligarchy, while a
Democracy tends to degenerate into Anarchy. Next arose the knowledge of
such things as are honourable and good, as opposed to those which are
bad and shameful. For where we have a monarchy, an aristocracy, and a democracy existing
together in the same city, each of the three serves as a check upon the
other. And such was
the good fortune of Rome that although her government passed from the
kings to the nobles, and from these to the people, by the steps and for
the reasons noticed above, still the entire authority of the kingly
element was not sacrificed to strengthen the authority of the nobles,
nor were the nobles divested of their authority to bestow it on the
commons; but three, blending together, made up a perfect State; which
perfection, as shall be fully shown in the next two Chapters, was
reached through the dissensions of the commons and the senate. When we do well without laws, laws are not needed; but when
good customs are absent, laws are at once required. So that we cannot truly declare those tumults
to have been disastrous, or that republic to have been disorderly, which
during all that time, on account of her internal broils, banished no
more than eight or ten of her citizens, put very few to death, and
rarely inflicted money penalties. And if the popular tumults
led the creation of the tribunes, they merit all praise; since these
magistrates not only gave its due influence to the popular voice in the
government, but also acted as the guardians of Roman freedom, as shall
be clearly shown in the following Chapter. Among
the Lacedæmonians of old, as now with the Venetians, it was placed
in the hands of the nobles, but with the Romans it was vested in the
commons. We have, therefore, to determine which of these States made the
wiser choice. Of such republics
we have an example in ancient times in Sparta, in modern times in
Venice, of both which States I have already made mention. In the second case he
might give his republic a constitution like that of Venice or Sparta;
but since extension is the ruin of such republics, the legislator would
have to provide in every possible way against the State which he had
founded making any additions to its territories. For to
form a tribunal by which a powerful citizen is to be tried, eight judges
only are not enough; the judges must be numerous, because a few will
always do the will of a few. The latter, being desired to say with whom the
treasure of which he had spoken was to be found, since the senate were
as anxious to know this as the commons, made no direct reply, but
answered evasively that it was needless to tell them what they already
knew. And there can be no more effectual means
for checking calumny than by affording ample facilities for impeachment,
which is as useful in a commonwealth as the other is pernicious. Again, it is before the magistrates, the people, or the
courts of justice that men are impeached; but in the streets and market
places that they are calumniated. Calumny, therefore, is most rife in
that State wherein impeachment is least practised, and the laws least
favour it. Where this is not
seen to, grave disorders will always ensue. Of this, though I could give many instances, I shall
content myself with one. After these, again, are ranked men of letters, who being of
various shades of merit are celebrated each in his degree. To all
others, whose number is infinite, is ascribed that measure of praise to
which his profession or occupation entitles him. Let him see also what praises they lavish
upon Brutus, because being unable, out of respect for his power, to
reproach Cæsar, they magnify his enemy. In the first of these two instances, therefore, citizens
whom love of their country and its laws could not have retained in
Italy, were kept there by the oath forced upon them; and in the second,
the tribune Marcus, to keep his oath, laid aside the hatred he bore
the father, and overlooked the injury done him by the son, and his own
dishonour. Thus did Lycurgus, thus Solon, and thus have done many besides who have
had the same end in view. But since the lives of princes are
short, the life of this prince, also, and with it his influence, must
soon come to an end; whence it happens that a kingdom which rests wholly
on the qualities of its prince, lasts for a brief time only; because
these qualities, terminating with his life, are rarely renewed in his
successor. For as Dante wisely says:--
"Seldom through the boughs
doth human worth renew itself; for such
the will of Him who gives it, that to Him
we may ascribe it. _Purg_. 121-123.] To which end they should countenance
and further whatsoever tells in favour of religion, even should they
think it untrue; and the wiser they are, and the better they are
acquainted with natural causes, the more ought they to do so. But since some are of opinion that the welfare of Italy depends upon the
Church of Rome, I desire to put forward certain arguments which occur to
me against that view, and shall adduce two very strong ones, which, to
my mind, admit of no answer. To the Church, therefore, and
to the priests, we Italians owe this first debt, that through them we
have become wicked and irreligious. And the Church
is the sole cause why Italy stands on a different footing, and is
subject to no one king or commonwealth. For this, I say, we Italians
have none to thank but the Church. If the fowls pecked, the engagement
was begun with a favourable omen. If they refused, battle was declined. But an opposite course was taken by Appius Pulcher, in Sicily, in
the first Carthaginian war. Some who in their terror declined to
swear, were forthwith slain by the centurions. The rest, warned by their
cruel fate, complied. And this is no more than we might
expect. All become its bitter enemies who, drawing their support
from the wealth of the tyrant, flourished under his government. But since these views may seem to conflict with what I have said above,
treating there of a republic and here of a prince, that I may not have
to return to the subject again, I will in this place discuss it briefly. Clearchus finding himself thus
placed between the arrogance of the nobles, whom he could in no way
either satisfy or correct, and the fury of the people, who could not put
up with the loss of their freedom, resolved to rid himself at a stroke
from the harassment of the nobles and recommend himself to the people. Of this we
have an example in the kingdom of France, which enjoys perfect security
from this cause alone, that its kings are bound to compliance with an
infinity of laws upon which the well-being of the whole people depends. For we see, as I have said a little way back, that a city which
owing to its pervading corruption has once begun to decline, if it is
to recover at all, must be saved not by the excellence of the people
collectively, but of some one man then living among them, on whose death
it at once relapses into its former plight; as happened with Thebes,
in which the virtue of Epaminondas made it possible while he lived to
preserve the form of a free Government, but which fell again on his
death into its old disorders; the reason being that hardly any ruler
lives so long as to have time to accustom to right methods a city which
has long been accustomed to wrong. These
institutions changed little, if at all, with circumstances. But the laws
by which the people were controlled, as for instance the law relating to
adultery, the sumptuary laws, the law as to canvassing at elections, and
many others, were altered as the citizens grew more and more corrupted. And
afterwards, instead of selecting those who were best liked, they came
to select those who had most influence; and in this way, from the
imperfection of their institutions, good men came to be wholly excluded. But since old institutions must either be reformed all at once, as soon
as they are seen to be no longer expedient, or else gradually, as the
imperfection of each is recognized, I say that each of these two courses
is all but impossible. But since the restoration of a State
to new political life presupposes a good man, and to become prince of
a city by violence presupposes a bad man, it can, consequently, very
seldom happen that, although the end be good, a good man will be found
ready to become a prince by evil ways, or that a bad man having become a
prince will be disposed to act virtuously, or think of turning to good
account his ill-acquired authority. By feeble princes, I
mean such as are not valiant in war. And for these reasons Rome, while she lived under her kings, was in
constant danger of destruction through a king who might be weak or bad. And such was his ability that, under his rule, the people very soon
became admirable soldiers. Of this we
have a very recent instance. Every one knows, how, only the other day,
the King of England invaded the realm of France with an army raised
wholly from among his own people, although from his country having been
at peace for thirty years, he had neither men nor officers who had ever
looked an enemy in the face. _Virg. Aen_. vi. 814.] It was agreed between Tullus king of Rome, and Metius king of Alba, that
the nation whose champions were victorious in combat should rule over
the other. _First_, that we should never
peril our whole fortunes on the success of only a part of our forces. And _third_, that those are never wise covenants which
we cannot or should not expect to be observed. This is enough to say of the third point which I noted as deserving
attention. No rasher step, therefore, could have been taken, than was taken
by these kings. For unless room be found in
this place of strength for almost all your army, the attempt to hold it
will almost always prove hurtful. Every one has heard with what difficulty Hannibal crossed the Alps
which divide France from Lombardy, and afterwards those which separate
Lombardy from Tuscany. Of this we have a recent
instance in the events of the year 1515. In this way the people were contented, and had no occasion from any
defect in the solemnities to desire the return of their kings. This, I say, should be seen to by him who would establish a
constitutional government, whether in the form of a commonwealth or of
a kingdom. When in the year 1505, Pope Julius II. So that the only inference to be drawn
was, that men know not how to be splendidly wicked or wholly good, and
shrink in consequence from such crimes as are stamped with an
inherent greatness or disclose a nobility of nature. This we may reasonably infer from remarking what, after the
expulsion of the kings, befell Collatinus and Publius Valerius; the
former of whom, though he had taken part in the liberation of Rome,
was sent into exile for no other reason than that he bore the name of
Tarquin; while the sole ground of suspicion against the latter, and what
almost led to his banishment, was his having built a house upon the
Cælian hill. And, to go to the root of the matter, I affirm that this vice
of ingratitude has its source either in avarice or in suspicion. So that the prince will be unable
to think of anything but how to secure himself; and to this end will
contrive how he may put his captain to death, or at any rate deprive him
of the credit he has gained with the army and among the people; doing
all he can to show that the victory was not won by his valour, but by
good fortune, or by the cowardice of the enemy, or by the skill and
prudence of those commanders who were with him at this or the other
battle. And of cases like
this, history is full. And if it be impossible for princes to free their minds
from such suspicions, there is nothing strange or surprising that a
people should be unable to do so. Of
the mistakes it commits in the effort to acquire liberty, I shall speak,
hereafter, in the proper place. _Tacit. Hist._ iv. 2.] Which conduct, as it excited no suspicion, could occasion no
ingratitude. But since like conditions seldom recur,
it can only rarely happen that like remedies are useful. For commonly those who make this attempt only add fuel to the
flame, and hasten the impending ruin. Favour of this sort, more than by anything
else, is attracted by those actions which seem to have in them a quality
of greatness, or which are performed by the young. Of this I might cite numerous examples, but shall
content myself with one relating to our own city. For some who survived him,
disregarding his counsels, combined against Cosimo and banished him from
Florence. This
fear led men to think of remedies, and the remedies to which they
resorted accelerated the destruction of the republic. In the second place, the dictator was not
created for life, but for a fixed term, and only to meet the emergency
for which he was appointed. When a republic is not provided with some safeguard such
as this, either it must be ruined by observing constitutional forms,
or else, to save it, these must be broken through. We may note, moreover, how prudently the Romans, in introducing this new
office, contrived the conditions under which it was to be exercised. Here,
however, we have to take into account both the mode in which, and the
term for which authority is given. For even if he could have taken his
consulship from one man, or his status as a senator from another, he
could not abolish the senatorial rank nor pass new laws. But on the creation of the Ten, the opposite of all this took
place. Should they, however
either from being deceived or otherwise blinded, be induced to bestow
authority imprudently, as the Romans bestowed it on the Ten, it will
always fare with them as with the Romans. But in whatever way it
happened, so it was, that this law was never spoken of in Rome without
the whole city being convulsed. For causes
such as these, the measure remained in abeyance down to the time of the
Gracchi; but being by them revived, finally overthrew the liberty of
Rome. But
afterwards, in the time of Cæsar and Pompey, the distemper broke out
afresh; for Cæsar heading the Marian party, and Pompey, that of Sylla,
and war ensuing, the victory remained with Cæsar, who was the first
tyrant in Rome; after whose time that city was never again free. Such,
therefore, was the beginning and such the end of the Agrarian Law. But since it has elsewhere been said that the struggle between the
commons and senate of Rome preserved her liberties, as giving rise to
laws favourable to freedom, it might seem that the consequences of the
Agrarian Law are opposed to that view. The two nations,
therefore, assembling a great army, attacked the Latins and Hernicians
and laid waste their country. But the Roman senate always took a sound view of things,
and always accepted the least hurtful course as the best. Of this I shall cite two other instances happening
in our own times, and in our own country. Beaumont accordingly took up his position
with his forces between Cascina and Pisa, to be in readiness to attack
the town. This
condition was absolutely rejected by the Florentines, and the siege
being proceeded with, they were forced to retire with disgrace. For when he got near Arezzo, and began
to negotiate with the Aretines, who, like the Pisans, were willing
to surrender their town on terms, the acceptance of these terms was
strongly disapproved in Florence; which Imbalt learning, and thinking
that the Florentines were acting with little sense, he took the entire
settlement of conditions into his own hands, and, without consulting
the Florentine commissioners, concluded an arrangement to his own
satisfaction, in execution of which he entered Arezzo with his army. On their return, the next
step was to depute certain persons to examine these laws and to draft
the new code. Very soon the whole authority of the commissioners came to
be centred in Appius, owing to the favour in which he was held by
the commons. For
without the senate they could take no warlike measures, while by
assembling the senate they seemed to put an end to their own authority. But Appius remaining behind to govern the city, it so fell
out that he became enamoured of Virginia, and that when he sought to
lay violent hands upon her, Virginius, her father, to save her from
dishonour, slew her. He who follows
these methods and observes them well, may contrive to save himself,
though he has the people for his enemy. But Appius could not follow the
plan of gaining over the peasantry, since in Rome they and the people
were one. And what he might have done he knew not how to do, and so was
ruined at the very outset. In creating the decemvirate, therefore, both the senate and the people
made grave mistakes. Most skilful, too, was his audacity in nominating himself
contrary to the expectation of the nobles, and in proposing colleagues
on whom he could depend to carry out his ends. For we see how favourably
disposed the youths whom Appius gathered round him became towards his
tyranny, in return for the trifling benefits which they drew from it;
and how Quintus Fabius, one of the second decemvirate and a most worthy
man, blinded by a little ambition, and misled by the evil counsels
of Appius, abandoning his fair fame, betook himself to most unworthy
courses, and grew like his master. For whereas the Romans were
always victorious under the consuls, under the decemvirs they were
always defeated. And in such reverence was the authority of the senate
held, that the commons, lacking leaders, durst make no reply. For we should never declare our intention beforehand, but watch for
every opportunity to carry it out. Appius rejoined, that the people should not
set at nought that right of appeal which they themselves had insisted on
with so much zeal. This, more than any other mischance, helped to
lessen the credit of the Friar; since if his law of appeal was salutary,
he should have caused it to be observed; if useless, he ought not to
have promoted it. This, as betraying the ambitious and partial turn of his mind, took from
his reputation and exposed him to much obloquy. These he obtains by
means honourable in appearance, either by supplying them with money or
protecting them against the powerful. How this may be done, shall presently be
explained. (Sall. Cat. 51.)] No sooner, however, was his name mentioned than
one began to whistle, another to laugh, some jeering at him in one way
and some in another. And the same thing happening in every case, each
and all of those nominated were judged unworthy of senatorial rank. The latter device made the people
ashamed to give, the former ashamed to refuse. For as
the censors became the arbiters of morals in Rome, it was very much
owing to them that the progress of the Romans towards corruption was
retarded. This, instead of order, has
occasioned the greatest disorder in our city. But this, for a reason
already mentioned, namely that a few will always be governed by the will
of a few and these the most powerful, was a change from bad to worse. So that, unless an accuser be wanting, a
tribunal is never wanting in Venice to keep powerful citizens in check. CINCINNATUS and Cn. In the Venetian Republic, the great council distributes honours and
offices. In this way the council was deprived of its facilities for
stopping public business to the danger of the State. But this, which they could not help doing, they did in such a
way as to earn the thanks of the people, by whom the concession was so
well received that all Rome was intoxicated with delight. For it seemed
to them a boon beyond any they could have ventured to hope for, or have
dreamed of demanding. For the paths wherein his danger lay were those which favoured the
Medici, and it was by these that his enemies attacked him, and in the
end overthrew him. Should they act otherwise, it will
fare with them as with Tullius, who, in seeking to diminish the power
of Marcus Antonius, added to it. For Antonius, who had been declared an
enemy by the senate, having got together a strong force, mostly made up
of veterans who had shared the fortunes of Cæsar, Tullius counselled the
senate to invest Octavianus with full authority, and to send him against
Antonius with the consuls and the army; affirming, that so soon as those
veterans who had served with Cæsar saw the face of him who was Cæsar's
nephew and had assumed his name, they would rally to his side and desert
Antonius, who might easily be crushed when thus left bare of support. For Antonius persuaded Octavianus
to take part with him, and to throw over Tullius and the senate. And
this brought about the ruin of the senate, a result which might easily
have been foreseen. When Veii fell, the commons of Rome took up the notion that it would be
to the advantage of their city were half their number to go and dwell
there. The
truth of what I say is confirmed by numberless examples both Roman and
foreign, modern and ancient. For this the people thought a base
course, not discerning the advantage resulting from it, which Fabius
could by no argument make plain to them. Whence came the battle and defeat of Cannæ, and
well-nigh the destruction of Rome. For wherever the people have a voice,
such proposals will always be well received, nor will those persons who
are opposed to them be able to apply any remedy. _Virg. Aen._, I. 154.] From this fact it may be
gathered what honesty and religion still prevail among this people. At the present time this virtue is the more to be admired, because it
seems to have survived in this province only. For the greatness of the undertaking
quickly daunts them, and so obstructs their advance they break down at
the very outset. For in Venice this
name of gentleman is a title of honour and dignity, and does not depend
on any of those circumstances in respect of which the name is given in
other States. And in Venice this occasions no disturbance, for reasons which I have
already explained. The causes of such manifestations ought, I think, to be inquired into
and explained by some one who has a knowledge, which I have not, of
causes natural and supernatural. The persons against whom these
proclamations were directed at first derided them; but, when the time
came for them to be obeyed, all obeyed them. And indeed the temper of the
multitude in such cases, cannot be better described than in this
passage. And if the Roman people mourned the loss of the dead Manlius,
it is no wonder; for they mourned his virtues, which had been of such
a sort that their memory stirred the regret of all, and would have had
power to produce the same feelings even in a prince; all writers being
agreed that excellence is praised and admired even by its enemies. But as for prudence and stability of purpose, I affirm that a people is
more prudent, more stable, and of better judgment than a prince. Again, it may be seen that a people, when once they have come to
hold a thing in abhorrence, remain for many ages of the same mind; which
we do not find happen with princes. For the truth of both of which
assertions the Roman people are my sufficient witness, who, in the
course of so many hundred years, and in so many elections of consuls
and tribunes, never made four appointments of which they had reason
to repent; and, as I have said, so detested the name of king, that no
obligation they might be under to any citizen who affected that name,
could shield him from the appointed penalty. Further, we find that those cities wherein the government is in the
hands of the people, in a very short space of time, make marvellous
progress, far exceeding that made by cities which have been always ruled
by princes; as Rome grew after the expulsion of her kings, and Athens
after she freed herself from Pisistratus; and this we can ascribe to no
other cause than that the rule of a people is better than the rule of a
prince. For if all the glories and all the defects both of peoples and
of princes be carefully weighed, it will appear that both for goodness
and for glory a people is to be preferred. So that there is this distinction between the
two, that with the one we fear what is, with the other what is likely to
be. But since the subject suggests it, it seems to me not out of place to
consider what alliances we can most trust, whether those made with
commonwealths or those made with princes. All things considered, I am disposed to believe that in most
cases they are alike, though in some they differ. Still, wherever there is fear, the want
of faith will be the same. Of this we have an instance in the proposal made
to the Athenians by Themistocles, when he told them at a public meeting
that he had certain advice to offer which would prove of great advantage
to their city, but the nature of which he could not disclose to them,
lest it should become generally known, when the opportunity for acting
upon it would be lost. But Philip of Macedon would not have so acted, nor any of
those other princes who have sought and found more profit in breaking
faith than in any other way. For you cannot subject men to hardships unless you hold
out rewards, nor can you without danger deprive them of those rewards
whereof you have held out hopes. And if there is to be no distinction in respect of blood,
nothing can be pleaded for a distinction in respect of age. On the
contrary, that distinction must of necessity cease to be observed. BOOK II. I speak not, here, of what relates to
the arts, which have such distinction inherent in them, that time can
give or take from them but little of the glory which they merit of
themselves. But to whatsoever cause we ascribe it, it never so chanced
that the Romans engaged in two great wars at the same time. On the
contrary, it always seemed as though on the breaking out of one war,
another was extinguished; or that on the termination of one, another
broke out. On the
contrary, they behaved towards the Romans as men behave towards those
whom they see prosper, rather taking their part and courting their
friendship. Nor did they discover their mistake until the Romans, after
subduing all the intervening nations, began to assail their power both
in Spain and Sicily. We know,
too, from history, what hurt a people or city suffers from servitude. Nor do we ever read of there being any kings
over them, except those who reigned in Rome, and Porsenna, king of
Etruria. In this way he only, and not his
country, is the gainer by his conquests. This we may gather from many of their customs, beginning with their
sacrificial rites, which were of much magnificence as compared with the
simplicity of our worship, though that be not without a certain dignity
of its own, refined rather than splendid, and far removed from any
tincture of ferocity or violence. For in its celebration many beasts were slaughtered, and this
being a cruel spectacle imparted a cruel temper to the worshippers. And this is the more remarkable when we see
that country, which once contained so many noble cities, and supported
so great a population, now almost uninhabited; and reflect that it
formerly enjoyed a government and possessed resources making its
conquest impossible to less than Roman valour. For all countries and provinces which enjoy complete freedom, make,
as I have said, most rapid progress. In such States, accordingly, we see
wealth multiply, both that which comes from agriculture and that which
comes from manufactures. This
may be effected in two ways, by gentleness or by force. But this could not have happened
with Rome, whose stem was mighty enough to bear any branch with ease. And this is well expressed by Titus Livius, in the words,
"_Crescit interea Roma Albae ruinis_." The third method is to hold other States in direct subjection to you,
and not merely associated with you as companions; and this was the plan
pursued by the Spartans and Athenians. And as she alone has lived in this way, so she alone has attained
to this pitch of power. And if the latter of these two methods be of
little utility among armed States, among those that are unarmed, as is
now the case with the republics of Italy, it is worse than useless. As for leagues, I
know of no nations who have had recourse to them in recent times except
the Swiss and the Suevians. The enemy, on being routed, to save their country from pillage,
very soon came to terms, when the Romans would take from them certain
portions of their territory. And no other system of defence could have been
at once so safe, so strong, and so effectual. And in this way they
came gradually to establish their name abroad, and to add to their
power. From the immigration
under Bellovesus resulted the occupation of Lombardy, and, subsequently,
the first war of the Gauls with Rome. The third of these wars broke out on the descent into
Italy of the Todi and Cimbri, who, after defeating several Roman armies,
were themselves defeated by Marius. For we see afterwards,
when the spirit of the Romans had declined, and their armies had lost
their former excellence, their supremacy was overthrown by men of the
same race, that is to say by the Goths, the Vandals, and others like
them, who spread themselves over the whole of the Western Empire. When those thus driven forth are in large numbers,
they violently invade the territories of other nations, slaughtering the
inhabitants, seizing on their possessions, founding new kingdoms, and
giving new names to provinces; as was done by Moses, and by those tribes
who overran the Roman Empire. When those constrained to abandon their homes are not in large numbers,
they are not so dangerous as the nations of whom I have been speaking,
since they cannot use the same violence, but must trust to their address
to procure them a habitation; and, after procuring it, must live with
their neighbours as friends and companions, as we find Æneas, Dido, the
Massilians, and others like them to have lived; all of whom contrived to
maintain themselves in the districts in which they settled, by securing
the good will of the neighbouring nations. Of the nations of whom I have been speaking, I shall now say no more. _Procop. Hist. Bell. Vand. As between
the Romans and the Samnites, the occasion of war was accidental. For in
making war upon the Sidicinians and afterwards on the Campanians, the
Samnites had no thought of involving themselves with the Romans. There are many circumstances, therefore, which may force a captain to
give battle contrary to his intention, among which the want of money may
sometimes be one. But this is no ground for pronouncing money to be the
sinews of war, any more than those other things from the want of which
men are reduced to the same necessity. Once more, therefore, I repeat
that not gold but good soldiers constitute the sinews of war. But,
indeed, there can be no better witness to the truth of my contention
than Titus Livius himself. As was the case in
our own times with the Florentines, when, in the year 1479, they were
attacked by the Pope and the King of Naples. On this occasion, therefore, the Campanians were misled by imagining
themselves stronger than they really were. For often, from defect of
judgment, men take upon them to defend others, when they have neither
skill nor ability to defend themselves. They cite
also the advice given by Hannibal to Antiochus, when the latter was
meditating a war on the Romans. They also cite Scipio, who to shift the war from Italy,
carried it into Africa. In this way you can use
your whole strength without risking your entire fortunes; whereas, in
leaving your country, you risk your entire fortunes, without putting
forth your whole strength. But now to speak my own mind on the matter, I think we should make this
distinction. Such valour did they display in distant wars, such
weakness in those that were near. But that he whose subjects are
unarmed, and whose country is not habituated to war, should always carry
the war to as great a distance as he can from home. Whence this astonishing forbearance, but
from their knowing our strength and their own weakness_?" At the same
time you will find your friends less zealous on your behalf, since to
them you will appear either weak or cowardly. This, in truth, was sound
advice and such as every prince and republic should lay to heart. Not less mischievous than doubtful resolves are those which are late and
tardy, especially when they have to be made in behalf of a friend. For
from their lateness they help none, and hurt ourselves. Now Titus Livius could not show more
clearly than he does in this passage, the mischief which results
from resting in suspense. But by delay they
stood to lose in every way, as the event showed. This cost the city of Florence dear, and
went near to lose her freedom, whereof she was afterwards deprived on
another like occasion. From this passage of Titus Livius, then, we learn that the Roman army
had three principal divisions, or battalions as we might now call them,
of which they named the first _hastati_, the second _principes_, and the
third _triarii_, to each of which cavalry were attached. Directly behind them,
in the second rank, they placed the _principes_; and in the third rank
of the same column, the _triarii_. If within a
town, either the town will be a small one, as fortified towns commonly
are, or it will be a great one. In the former case, he who is on the
defensive is at once undone. As to the remaining method, which consists in your taking up your
position in an entrenched camp, where you need not fight unless you
please, and unless you have the advantage, I say that this method
commonly affords you no greater facility for avoiding an engagement than
the ancients had; nay, that sometimes, owing to the use of artillery,
you are worse off than they were. For having posted themselves between
the river Ronco and an earthwork, from their not having carried this
work high enough, and from the French having a slight advantage of
ground, they were forced by the fire of the latter to quit their
entrenchments come to an engagement. Still, we do not often find either of these two dangers
occasioning extraordinary loss. For, at Ravenna, M. de Foix died by steel and
not by shot. As to the third assertion, that armies can no longer be brought to
engage one another, and that war will soon come to be carried on wholly
with artillery, I maintain that this allegation is utterly untrue, and
will always be so held by those who are willing in handling their troops
to follow the usages of ancient valour. He who looks for any further advantage from artillery does
not rightly understand its nature, and trusts to what is most likely
to deceive him. The same expedient was resorted to by them in
many of their other battles, and always in their sorest need they found
it their surest stay. But, apart from authority, there are manifest reasons to bear out what I
say. Again, infantry,
when drawn up in column, can easily break and is not easily broken by
cavalry. But the substance and sinew of an army, and that part of it
which ought constantly to be most considered, should always be the
infantry. And to such a length was this bad system carried, that in the
very greatest army only the smallest sprinkling of infantry was to be
found. And
from this I conclude that foot-soldiers, if rightly handled, can hardly
be beaten except by other soldiers fighting on foot. Now, however, this
error is demonstrated by the example of the northern nations. He who is impoverished by his wars, even should he come off
victorious, can add nothing to his strength, since he spends more than
he gains, as the Venetians and Florentines have done. _Juv. Sat. vi. 292.] For having given the subject very full
consideration elsewhere, here I would be brief. Of the truth whereof,
besides the ancient instances which might be noted, we have a recent
example here in Italy. But why turn for examples to Capua and Rome, when we have them close at
hand in Tuscany and Florence? For in many matters,
unless these deliberations be guided by men of great parts, the
conclusions come to are certain to be wrong. For Francis of Angoulême, succeeding on the death
of Louis XII. For
the forces of the Spanish king were then in Lombardy, and the army of
the Emperor at Verona. How baseless this expectation was, was seen from the event. And this is effected either by making
such sure work with them as puts it out of their power to do you injury,
or else by so loading them with benefits that it would be folly in them
to seek to alter their condition. So far as the Latins are concerned, you
can secure a lasting peace either by clemency or by severity. Would
you deal harshly with those whom you have conquered and who have given
themselves into your hands, you can blot out the whole Latin nation. That, assuredly, is the strongest government which they rejoice in who
obey it. How necessary it was for the Romans to execute Justice against the
Latins, is further seen from the course took with the men of Privernum. Whence,
the frequent rebellions and the downfall of States. And while Rome retained her freedom, and adhered
to her own wise ordinances and wholesome usages, she never built a
single fortress with the view to hold any city or province, though,
sometimes, she may have suffered those to stand which she found already
built. Nor was
this fortress, which in peace had occasioned them much hurt, any defence
or of any service them in war. Every one knows how, in 1507, Genoa rose in rebellion against Louis XII. But, afterwards, in
the year 1512, when the French were driven out of Italy, the Genoese, in
spite of this citadel, again rebelled, and Ottaviano Fregoso assuming
the government, after the greatest efforts, continued over a period of
sixteen months, at last succeeded in reducing the citadel by famine. For when he could come into Italy with an army, he could
recover Genoa, though he had no citadel there; but when he could not
come with an army, it was not in his power to hold the city by means of
the citadel. Let us turn now to those republics which build fortresses not within
their own territories, but in towns whereof they have taken possession. And if the above example of France and Genoa suffice not to show the
futility of this course, that of Florence and Pisa ought, I think, to
be conclusive. Of how little service these Pisan fortresses
were, was seen on the coming of Charles VIII. So that this instance cannot be considered conclusive as against
others of a contrary tendency. For good armies without fortresses are in
themselves a sufficient defence: whereas, fortresses without good armies
avail nothing. The prince, therefore, who can bring together a strong army can do
without building fortresses, while he who has not a strong army ought
not to build them, but should carefully strengthen the city wherein he
dwells, and keep it well stored with supplies, and its inhabitants well
affected, so that he may resist attack till an accord be agreed on, or
he be relieved by foreign aid. Where this is well managed, it will
almost always happen that you succeed in effecting the object you
propose to yourself. Of this we find a notable instance in Asia, in
connection with the siege of Amida. So mischievous a thing did the Romans esteem it to use insulting words
to others, or to taunt them with their shame. _Tacit. 68.] After routing the Romans at Cannæ, Hannibal sent messengers to Carthage
to announce his victory, and to ask support. But they, puffed up by
their success, not merely refused the terms offered, but put to death
the envoy sent to propose them. This offer the people of Florence in their pride rejected, and so
gave occasion for the sack of Prato and the overthrow of the Florentine
Republic. Whereof we have no finer or truer
example than in the death of Philip of Macedon, the father of Alexander. And
all who stand in her way, she either removes by death, or deprives of
the means of effecting good. But the States of which I speak, leaving
the heart undefended, defend only the hands and feet. The mischief which
has thus been, and is at this day wrought in Florence is plain enough
to see. And the same was witnessed a
few years ago in the case of the Venetians, whose city, had it not been
girdled by the sea, must then have found its end. This we may ascribe to the heart being well guarded, while
the extremities were but little heeded. And when to both inquiries the envoys
answered, "No," Hanno observed that the war was no nearer an end than on
the day it was begun. It behoves us, therefore, to
remember how empty are the promises, and how doubtful the faith, of men
in banishment from their native land. But
afterwards, when he could not fulfil what he had promised, either from
shame, or through fear of punishment, he poisoned himself. Assaults were effected either by open force, or by force
and stratagem combined. In this way they
often succeeded in carrying towns, and even great towns, at a first
onset, as when Scipio took new Carthage in Spain. Consequently, as I have said,
this method of attack was often successful. The capture of towns by stratagem combined with force is effected, as
by the Romans at Palæopolis, through a secret understanding with some
within the walls. This we must suppose due rather to some special and occult
quality inherent in the man, than to success being naturally to be
looked for in the like attempts. As to the first, we have seen how it was necessary that Rome should
be taken by the Gauls, that being thus in a manner reborn, she might
recover life and vigour, and resume the observances of religion and
justice which she had suffered to grow rusted by neglect. In a
Commonwealth, accordingly, this end is served either by the virtues of
some one of its citizens, or by the operation of its institutions. This is enough to say concerning commonwealths, but as regards sects, we
see from the instance of our own religion that here too a like renewal
is needed. And that all may understand how much the actions of particular citizens
helped to make Rome great, and how many admirable results they wrought
in that city, I shall now proceed to set them forth and examine them;
with which survey this Third Book of mine, and last division of the
First Decade of Titus Livius, shall be brought to a close. I shall
begin, therefore, with Brutus, the father of Roman freedom. And, so, from not knowing how to resemble
Brutus, he lost power, and fame, and was driven an exile from his
country. For we see that many more princes have lost their lives and states
through these than in open warfare; power to wage open war upon a prince
being conceded to few, whereas power to conspire against him is denied
to none. A prince ought, therefore, to avoid this load of public
hatred. Injuries are either to a man's life, to his property, or to his honour. After menaces to life, injuries to property and honour stir men more
than any others, and of these a Prince has most to beware. For he runs no risk before
executing his design, since as he imparts it to none, there is none to
bring it to the ear of the prince. For every one must,
at some time or other, have leave to speak to the prince, and whoever
has this leave has opportunity to accomplish his design. For men of humble
rank, and such as are not the intimates of their prince, are neither
fed by the hopes nor possessed of the opportunities essential for such
attempts. So that should we ever find these weaklings attempting anything,
we may commend their courage rather than their prudence. The only instance in recent times of such attempts succeeding, is the
conspiracy of Jacopo IV. d'Appiano against Messer Piero Gambacorti, lord
of Pisa. For Jacopo, who had been bred and brought up by Piero, and
loaded by him with honours, deprived him of his State. The prince, therefore, who would guard himself against plots, ought more
to fear those men to whom he has been too indulgent, than those to whom
he has done great wrongs. From all which
preparations Milichus conjecturing what work was in hand, accused
Scaevinus before Nero; whereupon Scaevinus was arrested, and with him
Natalis, another of the conspirators, who the day before had been seen
to speak with him for a long time in private; and when the two differed
in their account of what then passed between them, they were put to the
torture and forced to confess the truth. In this way the conspiracy was
brought to light, to the ruin of all concerned. And that all may learn to do as they did I shall
notice the case of Piso, of which mention has before been made. Shun writing, therefore, as you would a rock, for there is nothing so
damning as a letter under your own hand. This fellow, turning traitor, and
accusing Epicharis to Nero, so stoutly did she deny the charge, that
Nero, confounded by her effrontery, let her go. A necessity of this sort leads almost always to the end desired, as two
instances may suffice to show. The Emperor Caracalla, being with his armies in Mesopotamia, had with
him Macrinus, who was more of a statesman than a soldier, as his
prefect. Maternianus, accordingly, wrote back that such designs were entertained
by Macrinus. As to the dangers attending the execution of plots, these result either
from some change made in the plan, or from a failure in courage on the
part of him who is to carry it out; or else from some mistake he falls
into through want of foresight, or from his not giving the affair its
finishing stroke, as when some are left alive whom it was meant to put
to death. Courage fails a conspirator either from his own poorness of spirit, or
from his being overcome by some feeling of reverence. For such majesty
and awe attend the person of a prince, that it may well happen that he
softens or dismays his executioners. He, at their request, repeatedly brought the
Duke into their company, so that they had full opportunity to make away
with him. Such irresolution can only have arisen
from their being overawed by the majesty of the prince, or touched by
his graciousness. The confusion of which I speak may either cause you to drop your weapon
from your hand, or to use words which will have the same results. Certain young Athenians conspired against Diocles and Hippias, tyrants
of Athens. Diocles they slew; but Hippias, making his escape, avenged
him. Clearchus fell, but Satirus
survived and avenged him. The Pazzi, of whom we have spoken so often,
succeeded in murdering Giuliano only. For Pelopidas had to deal, not with two tyrants only,
but with ten; and so far from having their confidence, could not, being
an outlaw, even approach them. And yet he succeeded in coming to Thebes,
in putting the tyrants to death, and in freeing his country. False alarms of this sort are to be taken into account
and allowed for, all the more that they are easily raised. And the more there are privy to the conspiracy, the likelier is this to
happen. As to the mischances which may befall, since these are unforeseen, they
can only be instanced by examples which may make men more cautious. This plot accordingly was marred, and Giulio's schemes
baulked, in consequence of a chance meeting. Against such accidents,
since they are out of the common course of things, no provision can
be made. Still it is very necessary to take into account all that may
happen, and devise what remedies you can. For the son and
two brothers of the Duke, who survived him, were able to avenge his
death. In cases like this, indeed, the conspirators may be held excused,
since there is nothing they can do to help themselves. So great was the respect
they paid to his quality. With the authority
which this lent him, he easily rose to such a pitch of power as to
become tyrant of Athens. Very soon,
however, this armed force gave him so much importance that he became the
supreme ruler of the State. Catiline, of whom we spoke just now, was
overthrown. Once executed, they entail no
further risks beyond those implied in the nature of a princedom. This arousing their suspicion, led them to
disclose their designs and endeavour to carry them out. Now, we could have no more instructive example than this in whatever way
we look at it. Where, however, conspiracies are weak, they may and should be
put down without scruple or hesitation. For Calippus having free leave to plot
against Dion, plotted to such effect, that he deprived him at once of
his State and life. Hist._ iv. 8.] _Juv. Sat._ x. 112.] The answer I take to be this. Now the government of Rome was of this nature, and the expulsion of the
Tarquins took place in this way. In such cases, therefore, the changes I speak of do not occasion any
very great danger. But since history abounds with instances of such changes I need say no
more about them. Now, had the people been corrupted, they
would not have refused this bribe, but would have opened rather than
closed the way to the tyranny. And herein we recognize the excellence of this city of Rome, and of the
materials whereof it was composed. "_Such_," says Livius, "_was the fate of a man worthy our
admiration had he not been born in a free State_." For we see that in what they do some men act impulsively, others warily
and with caution. Nor,
on the other hand, could Fabius have fallen upon times better suited to
the methods which he used, and by which he crowned himself with glory. For he perceived not that the times had changed, and that
with them it was necessary to change the methods of prosecuting the war. But, afterwards, when a time came when it behoved him to have
done with patience and gentleness, he knew not how to drop them, and was
ruined together with his country. As to why such changes are impossible, two reasons may be given. But since I have made mention of Fabius Maximus who wore out Hannibal by
keeping him at bay, I think it opportune to consider in the following
Chapter whether a general who desires to engage his enemy at all risks,
can be prevented by that enemy from doing so. For the truth of the matter is, that a captain who would keep the
field, cannot decline battle when his adversary forces it on him at all
hazards. So that the instruction to avoid battle is but tantamount to
saying, "You shall engage when it pleases your enemy, and not when it
suits yourself." For had Hannibal desired to fight,
Fabius would have waited for him and fought him. In
no other circumstances, however, can an engagement be avoided without
dishonour or danger. And if Philip was lucky enough to escape,
another, not similarly favoured by the nature of the ground, might not
have the same good fortune. But since he took not that course, we may infer
that he was moved by sufficient reasons. And there is this also to be kept in view, that we must strive, even if
we be defeated, to gain glory; and that more glory is to be won in being
beaten by force, than in a defeat from any other cause. But
this was not the case with Hannibal when he had to encounter Fabius, nor
with the Gauls when they were opposed to Sulpitius. But
until the war broke out, few of the Venetian citizens recognized the
danger, fewer still the remedy, and none ventured to prescribe it. For all the towns in the neighbourhood of Venice
have been used to live under princes and not in freedom; and those who
are used to servitude commonly think little of changing masters, nay are
often eager for the change. In this way Venice, though she has had more
powerful neighbours than Florence, has been able, from finding their
towns less stubborn, to subdue them more easily than the latter,
surrounded exclusively by free cities, has had it in her power to do. By means such as these, therefore, cities innumerable
have been brought into subjection, as recently was the case with
Florence. From this incident, says Titus Livius, we may learn that the
spread of the Roman power was due more to the valour of her captains
than of her soldiers. And,
conversely, when he went to encounter Pompeius in Thessaly, he said, "_I
go against a captain without an army_. "[1]
A further question may also be raised, whether it is easier for a good
captain to make a good army, or for a good army to make a good captain. So
that the question may seem to be equally balanced, excellence on one
side generally finding excellence on the other. But if a cry like this, produce great effect
on a well disciplined army, far greater must be its effect on one which
is ill disciplined and disorderly. For by such a wind the whole mass
will be moved, as I shall show by a well-known instance happening in our
own times. In this way, and from
this trifling circumstance, the attempt of the Oddeschi came to nothing. For a tumultuary
host is useless in war, simply because every word, or cry, or sound, may
throw it into a panic and cause it to fly. But the trick being detected by the king, turned out not only
useless but hurtful to its contriver. But a republic
should beware not to rouse such feelings, as I shall show in the
following Chapter. It was from a mistake
of this sort, that Brutus and Cassius lost the battle of Philippi. His success, as we see, turned entirely on his being
the first to be informed of the enemy's condition. d'Appiano, lord of Piombino, and Count Rinuccio
of Marciano. Quintius, on the contrary, by kindly and humane treatment, kept
his men obedient and returned victorious to Rome. From this it might
seem that to govern a large body of men, it is better to be humane than
haughty, and kindly rather than severe. When those over whom you exercise
authority are your equals, you cannot trust wholly to punishment or to
that severity of which Tacitus speaks. But since I
have spoken of punishment and indulgence, it seems not out of place
to show how a single act of humanity availed more than arms with the
citizens of Falerii. But compare Annals, III. For all the States of Italy revolted in his
favour, and all the Italian nations ranged themselves on his side. Yet from each of these two tendencies,
grave mischiefs, and such as lead to the ruin of a prince, may arise. He who is not of such a temper must be careful not
to impose tasks of extraordinary difficulty, but may use his natural
gentleness in imposing such as are ordinary. For common punishments are
not imputed to the prince, but to the laws and ordinances which he has
to administer. Such commands are useful in a
republic, as restoring its ordinances to their original efficacy and
excellence. Valerius, on the other hand, could
afford to act humanely, because for him it was enough if all were done
which in a Roman army it was customary to do. In this way Valerius had room
to exercise that humane disposition which enabled him at once to gain
influence over his soldiers and to content them. This, I take it, is matter of dispute, since both methods
have their advocates. When called on to act, his bounty
and generosity never fell short. When he had to speak, he was as mindful
of the feelings of others as of his own dignity. So that weighing all that
the historians tell us of these two captains, it might be difficult to
decide between them. The latter he
can secure by discipline and by his reputation for valour. And this is a matter of much importance. Elsewhere I have shown that no ordinance is of such advantage to a
commonwealth, as one which enforces poverty on its citizens. And before this
he had made Lucius Tarquininus, although forced by his poverty to serve
on foot, his master of the knights. For her father being dead, her guardian wished
her to wed the plebeian, her mother the noble. And so hot grew the
dispute that resort was had to arms, the whole nobility siding with
their fellow-noble, and all the plebeians with the plebeian. The latter
faction being worsted, left the town, and sent to the Volscians for
help; whereupon, the nobles sought help from Rome. The Volscians were
first in the field, and on their arrival encamped round Ardea. They then entered Ardea, and putting all the ringleaders in
this dispute to the sword, composed the disorders of the city. Of this we could
have no better instance than in the city of Pistoja. In this way a sort of settlement
was arrived at, which continues in operation up to the present hour. There can be no question, however, that the first of the methods named
would have been the surest. In the first place, it is
impossible for the ruling power, whether prince or republic, to be
friends with both factions. For wherever there is division, it is human
nature to take a side, and to favour one party more than another. Should the ruling power be a republic, there is
nothing so likely to corrupt its citizens and sow dissension among them,
as having to control a divided city. To
which Biondo testifies, when, in speaking of the citizens of Florence
and Pistoja, he says, "_In seeking to unite Pistoja the Florentines
themselves fell out_. "[1] It is easy, therefore, to understand how much
mischief attends on such divisions. Blondri Hist._, dec. ii. lib. 9. Basle ed. 1559, p.
337]
[Footnote 2: The heraldic Lion of Florence.] These, briefly,
are two, public or secret. But
credit acquired by secret practices, which is the other method spoken
of, is most perilous and prejudicial. This resulted from the wickedness of these lords, and
not, as they asserted, from the evil disposition of their subjects. Of the first, which was to be directed
against the Etruscans, he himself assumed command. The third army,
which he designed for the protection of the city, and the defence of
the gates and Curia, he entrusted to Lucius Quintius. And he further
directed, that Horatius, one of his colleagues, should furnish supplies
of arms, and corn, and of all else needful in time of war. Wisely, therefore, does Titus
Livius use concerning him the words which I have cited. The necessity of this course was well
understood by the Friar Girolamo Savonarola, and by the Gonfalonier
Piero Soderini. Further, we have to note that there is no
more hazardous or less useful defence than one conducted without method
or system. Here, therefore,
we see that in times of adversity the Romans were neither cast down nor
dismayed. And while this is true of individual men, it holds good also of a
concourse of men living together in one republic, who will arrive at
that measure of perfection which the institutions of their State permit. For as a State is not and
cannot always be at war, you must have opportunity to train your army in
times of peace; but this, having regard to the cost, you can only have
in respect of your own subjects. The towns of Cære and Velitræ, two of her own colonies, revolted from
Rome in expectation of being protected by the Latins. The causes which give
it this confidence are its being well armed and disciplined, and the
soldiers knowing one another. The observance of these precautions will give an army great confidence,
and such confidence leads to victory. But if any consul or other leader ever joined battle
contrary to the auspices, the Romans would punish him, as they did
Claudius Pulcher. But the observances of religion must be accompanied by valour, for
otherwise they can nothing avail. And of all the three causes which create a prepossession in a
man's favour, none is so effectual as this last. But this third mode of judging, which originates in
and rests upon his actions, at once gives him a name which can only be
destroyed by his afterwards doing many actions of a contrary nature. Actions like this are necessary not only to lay a foundation for your
fame, but also to maintain and extend it. To which end, they must
continually be renewed, as we find done by Titus Manlius throughout the
whole course of his life. But since a people may happen to be deceived as regards the character,
reputation, and actions of a man, thinking them better or greater than
in truth they are, an error a prince is less likely to fall into from
his being informed and warned by his advisers, in order that the people
may not lack similar advice, wise founders of republics have provided,
that when the highest dignities of the State, to which it would be
dangerous to appoint incapable men, have to be filled up, and it appears
that some incapable man is the object of the popular choice, it shall be
lawful and accounted honourable for any citizen to declare in the public
assemblies the defects of the favoured candidate, that the people, being
made acquainted therewith, may be better able to judge of his fitness. For
as men judge of things by their results, any evil which ensues from such
measures will be imputed to their author. This so enraged him against the bashaw on whose
advice he had acted, that he forthwith put him to death. Certain
citizens of Rome, for instance, were very active in forwarding a law
allowing the appointment of a plebeian to be consul. For your danger lies in many having opposed you, who
afterwards, should your advice prove hurtful, combine to ruin you. On this head, then, I know of no other advice to offer. and so
saying, slew him with his own hand. And, to prove this, I say, that armies are of three kinds. But since we have daily proofs of this
absence of valour, it were needless to set forth particular instances of
it. And this is a better course than to undertake to defend
and then to fail; for by refusing to defend, you lose only your friend;
whereas in failing, you not only lose your friend, but weaken yourself. But since in this Discourse I have referred by name to Valerius
Corvinus, in my next Chapter I shall cite his words to show what manner
of man a captain ought to be. And while practice is needed for perfection in every art, in
this it is needed in the highest degree. Nor can that knowledge of countries which I have spoken of as necessary
in a commander, be obtained in any convenient way except by the chase. But since we
may read of many instances of such frauds, I shall not cite them here. in dealing with France, and by M. de Foix, the general
of the French king, in dealing with the Marquis of Mantua. But, to get there he had to choose between two routes, one long and
circuitous leading through the territories of the king, the other short
and direct. For he was in league with the Venetians and with the
Pope, and had a son in the hands of the latter; all which circumstances
would have afforded him fair pretexts for refusal. But carried away by
the suddenness and urgency of the demand, he yielded. Whence we see that of the two methods, that of
Fabius was the safer and the more deserving our imitation. And while this holds good of all cities, we have many instances of it
in reading the history of Rome. After defeating the Romans on the Allia, the Gauls, hastening on to
Rome, found the gates of the city left open and unguarded. From all which circumstances
his duplicity might have been suspected, since, had he meant to do as
he had engaged, it was most unlikely that he should be negotiating so
openly. The poisoners and the Bacchanals, therefore, were punished as
their crimes deserved. THE END.