In the Euthyphro, Socrates is
awaiting his trial for impiety. 'Yes, they are;' and Euthyphro will gladly tell
Socrates some more of them. To this Euthyphro agrees. Socrates proceeds to analyze the new form of the definition. the act of being
carried, loved, etc. 'Yes.' 'No.' To what end do
we serve the gods, and what do we help them to accomplish? 'Nay, but we give them
honour.' But Euthyphro is in a
hurry and cannot stay. The chief
difference between us and them is, that they were slowly learning what
we are in process of forgetting. But piety or holiness is
preceded by the act of being pious, not by the act of being loved; and
therefore piety and the state of being loved are different. Socrates points
out the anthropomorphism of these notions, (compare Symp. EUTHYPHRO
PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, Euthyphro. SCENE: The Porch of the King Archon. EUTHYPHRO: Why have you left the Lyceum, Socrates? SOCRATES: Not in a suit, Euthyphro; impeachment is the word which the
Athenians use. EUTHYPHRO: What! SOCRATES: Certainly not. EUTHYPHRO: Then some one else has been prosecuting you? SOCRATES: Yes. EUTHYPHRO: And who is he? SOCRATES: A young man who is little known, Euthyphro; and I hardly know
him: his name is Meletus, and he is of the deme of Pitthis. EUTHYPHRO: No, I do not remember him, Socrates. SOCRATES: What is the charge? EUTHYPHRO: I hope that he may; but I rather fear, Socrates, that the
opposite will turn out to be the truth. SOCRATES: He brings a wonderful accusation against me, which at first
hearing excites surprise: he says that I am a poet or maker of gods, and
that I invent new gods and deny the existence of old ones; this is the
ground of his indictment. EUTHYPHRO: I understand, Socrates; he means to attack you about the
familiar sign which occasionally, as you say, comes to you. He thinks
that you are a neologian, and he is going to have you up before the
court for this. SOCRATES: Their laughter, friend Euthyphro, is not a matter of much
consequence. EUTHYPHRO: I am never likely to try their temper in this way. SOCRATES: I dare say not, for you are reserved in your behaviour, and
seldom impart your wisdom. EUTHYPHRO: I dare say that the affair will end in nothing, Socrates, and
that you will win your cause; and I think that I shall win my own. SOCRATES: And what is your suit, Euthyphro? EUTHYPHRO: I am the pursuer. SOCRATES: Of whom? EUTHYPHRO: You will think me mad when I tell you. SOCRATES: Why, has the fugitive wings? EUTHYPHRO: Nay, he is not very volatile at his time of life. SOCRATES: Who is he? EUTHYPHRO: My father. SOCRATES: Your father! EUTHYPHRO: Yes. SOCRATES: And of what is he accused? EUTHYPHRO: Of murder, Socrates. SOCRATES: By the powers, Euthyphro! EUTHYPHRO: Indeed, Socrates, he must. SOCRATES: I suppose that the man whom your father murdered was one of
your relatives--clearly he was; for if he had been a stranger you would
never have thought of prosecuting him. EUTHYPHRO: I am amused, Socrates, at your making a distinction between
one who is a relation and one who is not a relation; for surely the
pollution is the same in either case, if you knowingly associate with
the murderer when you ought to clear yourself and him by proceeding
against him. Which shows, Socrates, how little they know
what the gods think about piety and impiety. SOCRATES: Good heavens, Euthyphro! EUTHYPHRO: The best of Euthyphro, and that which distinguishes him,
Socrates, from other men, is his exact knowledge of all such matters. SOCRATES: Rare friend! EUTHYPHRO: Yes, indeed, Socrates; and if he attempts to indict me I am
mistaken if I do not find a flaw in him; the court shall have a great
deal more to say to him than to me. SOCRATES: And I, my dear friend, knowing this, am desirous of becoming
your disciple. EUTHYPHRO: To be sure, Socrates. SOCRATES: And what is piety, and what is impiety? EUTHYPHRO: Piety is doing as I am doing; that is to say, prosecuting any
one who is guilty of murder, sacrilege, or of any similar crime--whether
he be your father or mother, or whoever he may be--that makes no
difference; and not to prosecute them is impiety. And yet when
I proceed against my father, they are angry with me. So inconsistent are
they in their way of talking when the gods are concerned, and when I am
concerned. SOCRATES: May not this be the reason, Euthyphro, why I am charged with
impiety--that I cannot away with these stories about the gods? Tell me, for the love of Zeus, whether you
really believe that they are true. EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates; and things more wonderful still, of which the
world is in ignorance. SOCRATES: And do you really believe that the gods fought with one
another, and had dire quarrels, battles, and the like, as the poets
say, and as you may see represented in the works of great artists? Are all these tales of the gods true, Euthyphro? EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates; and, as I was saying, I can tell you, if you
would like to hear them, many other things about the gods which would
quite amaze you. SOCRATES: I dare say; and you shall tell me them at some other time when
I have leisure. When asked, you only replied, Doing as you
do, charging your father with murder. EUTHYPHRO: And what I said was true, Socrates. SOCRATES: No doubt, Euthyphro; but you would admit that there are many
other pious acts? EUTHYPHRO: There are. SOCRATES: Remember that I did not ask you to give me two or three
examples of piety, but to explain the general idea which makes all pious
things to be pious. Do you not recollect that there was one idea which
made the impious impious, and the pious pious? EUTHYPHRO: I remember. SOCRATES: Tell me what is the nature of this idea, and then I shall
have a standard to which I may look, and by which I may measure actions,
whether yours or those of any one else, and then I shall be able to say
that such and such an action is pious, such another impious. EUTHYPHRO: I will tell you, if you like. SOCRATES: I should very much like. EUTHYPHRO: Piety, then, is that which is dear to the gods, and impiety
is that which is not dear to them. SOCRATES: Very good, Euthyphro; you have now given me the sort of answer
which I wanted. EUTHYPHRO: Of course. SOCRATES: Come, then, and let us examine what we are saying. EUTHYPHRO: It was. SOCRATES: And well said? EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates, I thought so; it was certainly said. SOCRATES: And further, Euthyphro, the gods were admitted to have
enmities and hatreds and differences? EUTHYPHRO: Yes, that was also said. SOCRATES: And what sort of difference creates enmity and anger? Do we not go at once to arithmetic, and put an end to them by a
sum? EUTHYPHRO: True. SOCRATES: Or suppose that we differ about magnitudes, do we not quickly
end the differences by measuring? EUTHYPHRO: Very true. SOCRATES: And we end a controversy about heavy and light by resorting to
a weighing machine? EUTHYPHRO: To be sure. SOCRATES: But what differences are there which cannot be thus decided,
and which therefore make us angry and set us at enmity with one another? EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates, the nature of the differences about which we
quarrel is such as you describe. SOCRATES: And the quarrels of the gods, noble Euthyphro, when they
occur, are of a like nature? EUTHYPHRO: Certainly they are. SOCRATES: They have differences of opinion, as you say, about good and
evil, just and unjust, honourable and dishonourable: there would
have been no quarrels among them, if there had been no such
differences--would there now? EUTHYPHRO: You are quite right. SOCRATES: Does not every man love that which he deems noble and just and
good, and hate the opposite of them? EUTHYPHRO: Very true. SOCRATES: But, as you say, people regard the same things, some as just
and others as unjust,--about these they dispute; and so there arise wars
and fightings among them. EUTHYPHRO: Very true. SOCRATES: Then the same things are hated by the gods and loved by the
gods, and are both hateful and dear to them? EUTHYPHRO: True. SOCRATES: And upon this view the same things, Euthyphro, will be pious
and also impious? EUTHYPHRO: So I should suppose. SOCRATES: Then, my friend, I remark with surprise that you have not
answered the question which I asked. EUTHYPHRO: But I believe, Socrates, that all the gods would be agreed as
to the propriety of punishing a murderer: there would be no difference
of opinion about that. SOCRATES: Well, but speaking of men, Euthyphro, did you ever hear any
one arguing that a murderer or any sort of evil-doer ought to be let
off? EUTHYPHRO: I should rather say that these are the questions which they
are always arguing, especially in courts of law: they commit all sorts
of crimes, and there is nothing which they will not do or say in their
own defence. SOCRATES: But do they admit their guilt, Euthyphro, and yet say that
they ought not to be punished? EUTHYPHRO: No; they do not. SOCRATES: Then there are some things which they do not venture to say
and do: for they do not venture to argue that the guilty are to be
unpunished, but they deny their guilt, do they not? EUTHYPHRO: Yes. SOCRATES: Then they do not argue that the evil-doer should not be
punished, but they argue about the fact of who the evil-doer is, and
what he did and when? EUTHYPHRO: True. SOCRATES: And the gods are in the same case, if as you assert they
quarrel about just and unjust, and some of them say while others deny
that injustice is done among them. EUTHYPHRO: That is true, Socrates, in the main. SOCRATES: But they join issue about the particulars--gods and men alike;
and, if they dispute at all, they dispute about some act which is called
in question, and which by some is affirmed to be just, by others to be
unjust. EUTHYPHRO: Quite true. SOCRATES: Well then, my dear friend Euthyphro, do tell me, for my better
instruction and information, what proof have you that in the opinion of
all the gods a servant who is guilty of murder, and is put in chains by
the master of the dead man, and dies because he is put in chains before
he who bound him can learn from the interpreters of the gods what he
ought to do with him, dies unjustly; and that on behalf of such an one
a son ought to proceed against his father and accuse him of murder. Prove to me that they do, and I will applaud your wisdom as long as
I live. EUTHYPHRO: It will be a difficult task; but I could make the matter very
clear indeed to you. SOCRATES: I understand; you mean to say that I am not so quick of
apprehension as the judges: for to them you will be sure to prove that
the act is unjust, and hateful to the gods. EUTHYPHRO: Yes indeed, Socrates; at least if they will listen to me. SOCRATES: But they will be sure to listen if they find that you are a
good speaker. EUTHYPHRO: Why not, Socrates? SOCRATES: Why not! certainly, as far as I am concerned, Euthyphro, there
is no reason why not. EUTHYPHRO: Yes, I should say that what all the gods love is pious and
holy, and the opposite which they all hate, impious. SOCRATES: Ought we to enquire into the truth of this, Euthyphro, or
simply to accept the mere statement on our own authority and that of
others? EUTHYPHRO: We should enquire; and I believe that the statement will
stand the test of enquiry. SOCRATES: We shall know better, my good friend, in a little while. EUTHYPHRO: I do not understand your meaning, Socrates. SOCRATES: I will endeavour to explain: we, speak of carrying and we
speak of being carried, of leading and being led, seeing and being seen. You know that in all such cases there is a difference, and you know also
in what the difference lies? EUTHYPHRO: I think that I understand. SOCRATES: And is not that which is beloved distinct from that which
loves? EUTHYPHRO: Certainly. SOCRATES: Well; and now tell me, is that which is carried in this state
of carrying because it is carried, or for some other reason? EUTHYPHRO: No; that is the reason. SOCRATES: And the same is true of what is led and of what is seen? EUTHYPHRO: True. SOCRATES: And a thing is not seen because it is visible, but conversely,
visible because it is seen; nor is a thing led because it is in the
state of being led, or carried because it is in the state of being
carried, but the converse of this. Do you not agree? EUTHYPHRO: Yes. SOCRATES: Is not that which is loved in some state either of becoming or
suffering? EUTHYPHRO: Yes. SOCRATES: And the same holds as in the previous instances; the state of
being loved follows the act of being loved, and not the act the state. EUTHYPHRO: Certainly. SOCRATES: And what do you say of piety, Euthyphro: is not piety,
according to your definition, loved by all the gods? EUTHYPHRO: Yes. SOCRATES: Because it is pious or holy, or for some other reason? EUTHYPHRO: No, that is the reason. SOCRATES: It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved? EUTHYPHRO: Yes. SOCRATES: And that which is dear to the gods is loved by them, and is in
a state to be loved of them because it is loved of them? EUTHYPHRO: Certainly. SOCRATES: Then that which is dear to the gods, Euthyphro, is not holy,
nor is that which is holy loved of God, as you affirm; but they are two
different things. EUTHYPHRO: How do you mean, Socrates? SOCRATES: I mean to say that the holy has been acknowledged by us to be
loved of God because it is holy, not to be holy because it is loved. EUTHYPHRO: Yes. SOCRATES: But that which is dear to the gods is dear to them because it
is loved by them, not loved by them because it is dear to them. EUTHYPHRO: True. SOCRATES: But, friend Euthyphro, if that which is holy is the same with
that which is dear to God, and is loved because it is holy, then that
which is dear to God would have been loved as being dear to God; but if
that which is dear to God is dear to him because loved by him, then that
which is holy would have been holy because loved by him. EUTHYPHRO: I really do not know, Socrates, how to express what I mean. SOCRATES: Your words, Euthyphro, are like the handiwork of my ancestor
Daedalus; and if I were the sayer or propounder of them, you might say
that my arguments walk away and will not remain fixed where they are
placed because I am a descendant of his. EUTHYPHRO: Nay, Socrates, I shall still say that you are the Daedalus
who sets arguments in motion; not I, certainly, but you make them
move or go round, for they would never have stirred, as far as I am
concerned. SOCRATES: Then I must be a greater than Daedalus: for whereas he only
made his own inventions to move, I move those of other people as well. And the beauty of it is, that I would rather not. But enough of this. Tell me, then--Is not that which is pious necessarily just? EUTHYPHRO: Yes. SOCRATES: And is, then, all which is just pious? or, is that which is
pious all just, but that which is just, only in part and not all, pious? EUTHYPHRO: I do not understand you, Socrates. SOCRATES: And yet I know that you are as much wiser than I am, as you
are younger. But, as I was saying, revered friend, the abundance of your
wisdom makes you lazy. Please to exert yourself, for there is no
real difficulty in understanding me. EUTHYPHRO: By all means. SOCRATES: I should not say that where there is fear there is also
reverence; for I am sure that many persons fear poverty and disease, and
the like evils, but I do not perceive that they reverence the objects of
their fear. EUTHYPHRO: Very true. SOCRATES: But where reverence is, there is fear; for he who has a
feeling of reverence and shame about the commission of any action, fears
and is afraid of an ill reputation. EUTHYPHRO: No doubt. SOCRATES: Then we are wrong in saying that where there is fear there
is also reverence; and we should say, where there is reverence there is
also fear. EUTHYPHRO: Quite well. SOCRATES: That was the sort of question which I meant to raise when
I asked whether the just is always the pious, or the pious always the
just; and whether there may not be justice where there is not piety; for
justice is the more extended notion of which piety is only a part. EUTHYPHRO: No, I think that you are quite right. SOCRATES: Then, if piety is a part of justice, I suppose that we should
enquire what part? Do you not
agree? EUTHYPHRO: Yes, I quite agree. SOCRATES: In like manner, I want you to tell me what part of justice
is piety or holiness, that I may be able to tell Meletus not to do me
injustice, or indict me for impiety, as I am now adequately instructed
by you in the nature of piety or holiness, and their opposites. EUTHYPHRO: Piety or holiness, Socrates, appears to me to be that part of
justice which attends to the gods, as there is the other part of justice
which attends to men. SOCRATES: That is good, Euthyphro; yet still there is a little point
about which I should like to have further information, What is the
meaning of 'attention'? Is it
not so? EUTHYPHRO: Certainly. SOCRATES: I should suppose that the art of horsemanship is the art of
attending to horses? EUTHYPHRO: Yes. SOCRATES: Nor is every one qualified to attend to dogs, but only the
huntsman? EUTHYPHRO: True. SOCRATES: And I should also conceive that the art of the huntsman is the
art of attending to dogs? EUTHYPHRO: Yes. SOCRATES: As the art of the oxherd is the art of attending to oxen? EUTHYPHRO: Very true. SOCRATES: In like manner holiness or piety is the art of attending to
the gods?--that would be your meaning, Euthyphro? EUTHYPHRO: Yes. SOCRATES: And is not attention always designed for the good or benefit
of that to which the attention is given? EUTHYPHRO: True. SOCRATES: As the dogs are benefited by the huntsman's art, and the oxen
by the art of the oxherd, and all other things are tended or attended
for their good and not for their hurt? EUTHYPHRO: Certainly, not for their hurt. SOCRATES: But for their good? EUTHYPHRO: Of course. SOCRATES: And does piety or holiness, which has been defined to be the
art of attending to the gods, benefit or improve them? EUTHYPHRO: No, no; that was certainly not what I meant. SOCRATES: And I, Euthyphro, never supposed that you did. EUTHYPHRO: You do me justice, Socrates; that is not the sort of
attention which I mean. SOCRATES: Good: but I must still ask what is this attention to the gods
which is called piety? EUTHYPHRO: It is such, Socrates, as servants show to their masters. SOCRATES: I understand--a sort of ministration to the gods. EUTHYPHRO: Exactly. SOCRATES: Medicine is also a sort of ministration or service, having in
view the attainment of some object--would you not say of health? EUTHYPHRO: I should. SOCRATES: Again, there is an art which ministers to the ship-builder
with a view to the attainment of some result? EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates, with a view to the building of a ship. SOCRATES: As there is an art which ministers to the house-builder with a
view to the building of a house? EUTHYPHRO: Yes. SOCRATES: And now tell me, my good friend, about the art which ministers
to the gods: what work does that help to accomplish? EUTHYPHRO: And I speak the truth, Socrates. SOCRATES: Tell me then, oh tell me--what is that fair work which the
gods do by the help of our ministrations? EUTHYPHRO: Many and fair, Socrates, are the works which they do. SOCRATES: Why, my friend, and so are those of a general. EUTHYPHRO: Certainly. SOCRATES: Many and fair, too, are the works of the husbandman, if I
am not mistaken; but his chief work is the production of food from the
earth? EUTHYPHRO: Exactly. SOCRATES: And of the many and fair things done by the gods, which is the
chief or principal one? EUTHYPHRO: I have told you already, Socrates, that to learn all these
things accurately will be very tiresome. SOCRATES: I think that you could have answered in much fewer words the
chief question which I asked, Euthyphro, if you had chosen. EUTHYPHRO: Yes, I do. SOCRATES: And sacrificing is giving to the gods, and prayer is asking of
the gods? EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates. SOCRATES: Upon this view, then, piety is a science of asking and giving? EUTHYPHRO: You understand me capitally, Socrates. SOCRATES: Yes, my friend; the reason is that I am a votary of your
science, and give my mind to it, and therefore nothing which you say
will be thrown away upon me. EUTHYPHRO: Yes, I do. SOCRATES: Is not the right way of asking to ask of them what we want? EUTHYPHRO: Certainly. SOCRATES: And the right way of giving is to give to them in return what
they want of us. EUTHYPHRO: Very true, Socrates. SOCRATES: Then piety, Euthyphro, is an art which gods and men have of
doing business with one another? EUTHYPHRO: That is an expression which you may use, if you like. SOCRATES: But I have no particular liking for anything but the truth. EUTHYPHRO: And do you imagine, Socrates, that any benefit accrues to the
gods from our gifts? SOCRATES: But if not, Euthyphro, what is the meaning of gifts which are
conferred by us upon the gods? EUTHYPHRO: What else, but tributes of honour; and, as I was just now
saying, what pleases them? SOCRATES: Piety, then, is pleasing to the gods, but not beneficial or
dear to them? EUTHYPHRO: I should say that nothing could be dearer. SOCRATES: Then once more the assertion is repeated that piety is dear to
the gods? EUTHYPHRO: Certainly. SOCRATES: And when you say this, can you wonder at your words not
standing firm, but walking away? EUTHYPHRO: I quite remember. SOCRATES: And are you not saying that what is loved of the gods is holy;
and is not this the same as what is dear to them--do you see? EUTHYPHRO: True. SOCRATES: Then either we were wrong in our former assertion; or, if we
were right then, we are wrong now. EUTHYPHRO: One of the two must be true. SOCRATES: Then we must begin again and ask, What is piety? For, if any man knows, you are he; and therefore
I must detain you, like Proteus, until you tell. I am sure, therefore, that you know the nature of piety and
impiety. Speak out then, my dear Euthyphro, and do not hide your
knowledge. EUTHYPHRO: Another time, Socrates; for I am in a hurry, and must go now. SOCRATES: Alas! my companion, and will you leave me in despair? End of the Project Gutenberg EBook of Euthyphro, by Plato