THE GERMAN WAR
THE GERMAN WAR
BY
ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE
AUTHOR OF "THE GREAT BOER WAR," ETC. ARTHUR CONAN DOYLE. THE CAUSES OF THE WAR 1
II. GREAT BRITAIN AND THE NEXT WAR 99
IX. That is the
essence of the situation. It is not words and phrases that we need,
but men, men--and always more men. If words can bring the men, then
they are of avail. If not, they may well wait for the times to mend. Each of these I will treat in its turn. On the other hand, a long list of occasions could very
easily be compiled on which we had helped them in some common cause
from the days of Marlborough to those of Blücher. In commerce our record was even more
clear. in
Germany. Such a feeling was
but natural and human. But in all matters of commerce, as in all
matters political before the dawn of this century, they have no
shadow of a grievance against us. Usually it was a sullen, silent dislike. "But it was very different with Germany," he says. It was so in the days of Marlborough, in those of the
Great Frederick, and in those of Napoleon. It is not too much to say that five years
ago a complete defeat of Germany in a European war would have
certainly caused British intervention. Such was the prevailing mood of the nation when they perceived
Germany, under the lead of her Emperor, following up her expressions
of enmity by starting with restless energy to build up a formidable
fleet, adding programme to programme, out of all possible proportion
to the German commerce to be defended or to the German coastline
exposed to attack. "The Admiral of
the Atlantic greets the Admiral of the Pacific," said the Kaiser in
a message to the Czar. It was necessary that we should find our
friends. And now we had to justify our friendship. In their madness they have wrought an irremediable evil to
themselves, to us, and to all Europe. This was caused by circumstances over
which we had no control and which we could not modify if we had
wished to do so. So far we could see their grievance, or
rather their misfortune, since no one was in truth to blame in the
matter. To these
jaundiced eyes all seemed yellow, when the yellowness lay only in
themselves. Our army, our navy, our Colonies, all were equally
rotten. "Old England, old, indeed, and corrupt, rotten through and
through." One blow and the vast sham would fly to pieces, and from
those pieces the victor could choose his reward. It may endure
for a day, but its doom is certain." See which will crack first, our democracy or this, now
that both have been plunged into the furnace together. "Our last and greatest
reckoning is to be with Great Britain," said the bitter Treitschke. If Britain were attacked, it was almost certain that
France and Russia would stand by her side. Public opinion
has to be strongly moved before our country can fight, and public
opinion under a Liberal Government might well be divided upon the
subject of Russia. Therefore, if the quarrel could be so arranged as
to seem to be entirely one between Teuton and Slav there was a good
chance that Britain would remain undecided until the swift German
sword had done its work. Such was the plan, and fortune favoured it. France ranged herself with Russia. Britain had guaranteed the
treaty, and Britain could be relied upon. "It is to us a vital
matter of strategy and is beyond argument," said the German soldier. "It is to us a vital matter of honour and is beyond argument,"
answered the British statesman. The die was cast. No compromise was
possible. That was the
sole question at issue. So he spoke, and History will endorse
his words, for we surely have our quarrel just. So much for the events which have led us to war. Now for a moment
let us glance at what we may have to hope for, what we may have to
fear, and above all what we must each of us do that we win through
to a lasting peace. Consider, on the other hand, what we should suffer if we were to
lose. We are but the leaves of the tree. There is darkness
and trouble if we lose. But if we take a broader sweep and trace the
meanings of this contest as they affect others than ourselves, then
ever greater, more glorious are the issues for which we fight. But the matter lies deep. Public opinion was poisoned at its very roots. Defeat shall not daunt us. Thus, as ever, the throes of evil may give
birth to good. If not, do it now, or
stand for ever shamed. [1] August 20, 1914. This was clear enough. All this, I say, I could not bring myself to believe. But I read
Bernhardi's book, and then I could not help believing. He was one
of the most noted officers in the German army. As I said at the time, "We should be mad if we did
not take very serious notice of the warning." One would imagine that the idea that the book
could be translated and read by his intended victims had never
occurred to the author. Such
were the plans, and dire the fate of the conquered. With France it was to be a final account. Our own
fate would be little better. But it will not be long. It is, as it seems to me, absolutely impossible that it should be
long. If it should happen that the military affairs of Germany are as
rotten as her diplomacy, then it certainly should not last long. For of that, at
least, there can be no dispute. That he
will be as brave as ever I have no doubt at all. I should expect to see
the German as good, but no better than his neighbours. He must not
only win, but win quickly. Like all such machines, if a few cogwheels stuck the
whole might racket itself to pieces." They have always been great
winners. They have not always been great in adversity. And it is the literature
of the devil. [2] September 10, 1914. But the evidence is
the other way. It is
perfectly miraculous. One would not have thought it possible that
people could be _always_ wrong. "India loathed us. He worked to harm us, and he has done so, but Lord! War sooner
or later was a certainty. It will be found very fully treated
in Professor Usher's book on _Pan-Germanism_, which, coming from an
American authority who seems to have studied his subject very
thoroughly, has the merit of impartiality. This is not
to be done on account of inability to pay the debt; but through a
deliberate, cold-blooded plot to weaken the creditor by robbing him
of his property. In war,
if Germany is conquered the debt necessarily holds good. But if
Germany wins, part of her reward of victory is the complete
repudiation of all debts. They are to be the judges of what these are, and if
repudiation of debt is considered to be one of them, then all debt
may be repudiated. She never can be now what she could so
easily have been. All this must be changed for the worse, and it is just that she
should suffer for her sins. We cannot say. What is
sure is that the real Germany, of whom Carlyle spoke, can never be
destroyed. Nor would we desire it. Of course, there are some great facts patent to all the world. There is, for
example, the reception of guns for a merchant cruiser in a South
American port which must have been sent off not later than July 10,
three weeks before the crisis developed. Since then I have never needed any reassurance upon the subject. But there is another matter which will insist on coming back into
one's thoughts when one reviews the events which preceded the war. "Surely
you feel more friendly to them now," said I at the end to one
distinguished officer. "All I want with them now is to fight them,"
said he. We have all been forced to come round to his point of view. Having got that idea thoroughly
infused into their very blood, the next step was clear. And it was a very formidable project. This need not trouble us. We are what we are,
and words will not alter it. Since then he has returned to the attack. He is a man to
whom we might well raise a statue, for I am convinced that his
cynical confession of German policy has been worth at least an army
corps to this country. He found no good thing
in them. It was
not show troops, General, who, with two corps, held five of your
best day after day from Mons to Compiègne. This must begin to break upon
you, and will surely grow clearer as the days go by. Says a Lincolnshire
sergeant, "They were in solid square blocks, and we couldn't help
hitting them." Says Private Tait (2nd Essex), "Their rifle shooting
is rotten. "They are rotten shots with their rifles," says an Oldham private. "No damned good as
riflemen," says a Connemara boy. As to their rifle fire, it was useless." "Artillery nearly as good
as our own, rifle fire beneath contempt," that is the verdict. They have every advantage which a nation would be
expected to have when it has known that war was a certainty, while
others have only treated it as a possibility. There is real
glory to be won to-day." This is no new phenomenon. "At last I have them, these English," he exclaimed,
as he gazed at the thin red line at Waterloo. "At last they have me,
these English," may have been his thought that evening as he spurred
his horse out of the debacle. Foy warned him of the truth. "The
British infantry is the devil," said he. "You think so because you
were beaten by them," cried Napoleon. This I say in no disparagement of our cavalry, who have
done so magnificently. All that cavalry can do will surely be
done by our cavalry. It is not on the chiefs of
the army that the whole guilt of this terrible crime must rest, but
it is upon the whole German nation, which for generations to come
must stand condemned before the civilised world for this reversion
to those barbarous practices from which Christianity, civilisation,
and chivalry had gradually rescued the human race. Take the very first incident of
the war, the mine-laying by the _Königin Luise_. Leaving the sea, let us turn to the air. The
same shot did for three at a time." "The
villages all round were burning." So the journal runs on
with its tale of infamy. At present the instances are isolated, and we will
hope that they do not represent any general condition. But the
stories come from sure sources. But it has undoubtedly been so in the past, and we
cannot say when it will end. After
all, what is is, and neither falsehood nor bombast will alter it. We have all but a single hate. We love as one, we hate as one,
We have one foe and one alone--
ENGLAND." This sort of thing is, it must be admitted, very painful and odious. He had no right to burn
uncondemned prizes, and a purist could claim that he was a pirate. If they, too, had acted as gentlemen, we should have felt
towards them as to von Müller. When Soult came to
London after the Napoleonic wars, he was cheered through the City. After the Boer War, Botha, de Wet, and Delarey had a magnificent
reception. They had been good fighters, the
fight was done, we had shaken hands--and we cheered them. Though the men
could no longer see each other, they were led up and their hands
were joined. So in war we have always wished to fight to a finish and
then be friends, whether we had won or lost. Now, this is just what we should wish to do with Germany, and it is
what Germany is rapidly making impossible. She has, in our opinion,
fought a brave but a thoroughly foul fight. It will be appalling. No other word can express it. It is not that we ask
them to abate the resistance of their country. It is understood that
this is a fight to the end. That is what we desire. But, alas! the
mischief is already, I fear, too deep. When the seeds are sown, it
is hard to check the harvest. Our foreign, like our home, politics are governed by
the vote of the proletariat. On the other hand, it seemed to be equally unthinkable that
Germany should attack us. If she won it, it was
difficult to see where she could hope for the spoils. We could not
give her greater facilities for trade than she has already. To me it seemed that there could be only one answer to
such a question. He is a man of note, and the first
living authority in Germany upon some matters of military science. We will hope not. We know that we have no wish for war, and desire
only to be left alone. Unfortunately, it takes two to make peace,
even as it takes two to make a quarrel. He says:--
"Again, from the Christian standpoint, we arrive at the
same conclusion. Christian morality is based, indeed, on
the law of love. 'Love God above all things, and thy
neighbour as thyself.' Christian morality is personal and social, and in
its nature cannot be political. It
tells us to love our individual enemies, but does not
remove the conception of enmity." Again:--
"Lastly, in all times the right of conquest by war has
been admitted. Then the only course left is to
acquire the necessary territory by war. It is not the possessor, but
the victor, who then has the right." One would have hoped that a noble ideal and a moral purpose
were something higher, but it would be vain to claim that any
country, ourselves included, have ever yet lived fully up to the
doctrine. War is necessary for Germany. Therefore, the immediate future is Germany's best opportunity. Poor France, once conquered, is to be very harshly treated. It is not said how Germany could permanently extinguish France, and
it is difficult to think it out. Altogether, the
permanent sterilisation of France would be no easy matter to
effect. So it was
in Marlborough's days. So in the days of Frederick. So also in those
of Napoleon. To all these ties, which had seemed to us to be of
importance, there is not a single allusion in this volume. One would have thought that there
was some statute of limitations in such matters, but apparently
there is none in the German mind. Having said so much, one may
point out that there were several mitigating circumstances in this
affair. The strain was very great, in a
quarrel which did not vitally affect ourselves. The British nation
had taken the view, not wholly unreasonably, that the war was being
waged in the interests of Hanover, and upon a German rather than a
British quarrel. When we stood out France did the same, so that the
balance of power between the combatants was not greatly affected. The British Government of the day believed that Napoleon
was about to possess himself of the Danish fleet and would use it
against themselves. It is not an exploit of which we need be proud, and
at the best can only be described as a most painful and unfortunate
necessity; but I should be surprised if the Danes, on looking back
to it, judge it more harshly than some more recent experiences which
they have had at the hands of General von Bernhardi's own
fellow-countrymen. Both
statements cannot be true. So much for the specific allegations against Great Britain. It is only the pirate, the slaver, and the
gun-runner who can justly utter such a reproach. tariff. There is, however, the
question of colonial expansion. But if Great Britain were out of the way, where would they find such
a place? Not in Canada, Australia, South Africa, or New Zealand. But that is an affair in which the United States, and not
we, are primarily interested, and one which it is not our interest
either to oppose or to support. "Since the struggle is necessary and inevitable, we must fight
it out, cost what it may." That is the situation as he depicts it. It
may be that he mistakes it. But for what it is worth, that is his
opinion and advice. If France is involved, she is to be annihilated, as already
described. In
quality of guns, he considers that the Germans have the advantage. If it be true, there are evil days coming
both for his country and for ours. We know, on the other hand, that it is
just such a situation which would bring about the federation of the
Empire. Still, it is
better to be a voice, however small, than an echo. Sandwiched
in between two armed nations as strong as herself, I do not believe
that there is the slightest possibility of it. It is not such men as
these who win our battles. [5] More now, alas! than ever.--Nov. The force becomes a nursery for the Army, which
has other reserves to draw upon before it reaches it. It might be a
single duel, or it might be with France as our ally. Let us see, then, how it would affect us
if it should come to pass. In the first place, it would not affect us at all as regards
invasion or raids. If the German submarines can dominate our own
large ships, our submarines can do the same for theirs. Therefore, if Great
Britain alone be at war with Germany, such a naval revolution would
merely affect our commerce and food supply. I cannot imagine that such a
fleet would entirely, or even to a very large extent, cut off our
supplies. Therefore
we should suffer privation, though not necessarily such privation as
would compel us to make terms. We need only think of Germany. But if we were in alliance with France, it becomes an
infinitely more important matter. Therefore, if France be wantonly
attacked, we must strain every nerve to prevent her going down, and
among the measures to that end will be the sending of a British
expeditionary force to cover the left or Belgian wing of the French
defences. Here lies, as it seems to me, the possible material for a great
national disaster. The possibilities are
appalling, for it might be not one submarine, but a squadron. Their convoy could do little to help them. [6] This, of course, would presuppose that Holland was
involved in the war.--A. We could not do it. Our answer must be the Channel Tunnel,
linking us closer to our ally. Let us, before leaving the subject, glance briefly at the objections
which have formerly been urged against the tunnel. We have no right to
assume that we shall always remain on as close a footing, but as our
common peril seems likely to be a permanent one, it is improbable
that there will be any speedy or sudden change in our relations. The
latter condition already exists in Dover, but the numbers might well
be increased. This is our passage. If the very worst happened, and
it were actually destroyed, we should be no worse off than we are
now. This need not trouble us. We are what we are,
and words will not alter it. He
further calls them "mercenaries," which is a misuse of terms. As every British soldier must by law be a British citizen,
the term is absurd. But there are other preparations which
should be made for such a contest, should it unhappily be forced
upon us. One is financial. Again, as so often before in the history
of British wars, it may prove that the last guinea wins. The cloud will dissolve or burst. Therefore, for a time we should husband our resources for the
supreme need. The British Fleet is their one shield. If it be broken,
Ireland will go down. But that is all
beside the question. We have not to do with his argument, but with
its results. "So it
really was so after all," represents the thought which comes to my
mind. It
has been said a thousand times elsewhere. And now we know for all
time that these countless scolding and minatory voices were not mere
angry units, but that they were in truth the collective voice of
the nation. Take each of them in turn. Britain seemed to be on the
verge of civil war. He is, for example, strongly of opinion
that battles will not as a rule last for more than one day. Even now, with the enemy at the gate, it seems to me to be
as open as ever.